



September 18, 2025 Meeting was convened at 11:00 AM Hybrid Meeting

Voting Members Present:	⊠Scott Cho (IBC Member)	⊠Alton Swennes (Animal Expert)
⊠Cecilia Gerstner (IBC Chair)	□ David Gillespie (IBC Member)	□ David Thomas (IBC Member)
⊠Jeff Clifford (IBC Vice Chair)	☐Talia Karasov (Plant Expert)	⊠Michael Voight (IBC Member)
⊠Debbie Eckert (BSO)	⊠John Kriesel (HGT Expert)	□Tom Wachter (IBC Member)
⊠Chris Hunter (ABSO)	⊠Karla McHale (IBC Member)	⊠Zemin Zhou (IBC Member) ُ
⊠Isaac Martineau (BS Specialist)	⊠Bart Mickelsen (IBC Member)	⊠Wendy Zhu (ÌBC Member)
⊠Ricky Bell (IBC Member)	⊠Kate Modzelewska (IBC	,
□Neil Bowles (IBC Member)	Member)	
⊠Jessica Brown (IBC Member)	⊠Andy Phillips (IBC Member)	
⊠Allison Carey (IBC Member)	⊠Robert Sperling (IBC Member)	

Quorum was present; 7 are required to conduct business.

### **Conflict of Interest Declaration**

None declared

#### Review of August 21, 2025 Minutes

Motion: Approve

Vote for Motion: 17 in favor of the motion

2 Abstain

#### Old Business

## #79-25 Gianna Hammer. Antigen Presenting Cells and Inflammation.

PI has not responded to post-review memo. Reminder email sent 9/10/25.

#87-25 Dustin Williams. Development of an Antimicrobial Pouch to Prevent Biofilm Implant-related Infection; Development of a Reloadable Antimicrobial Pouch to Prevent Biofilm Implant-Related Infection; BSL-2 Work in BBRL Lab (BPRB Room 249); Waxworm Infection Model; Sustained release drug delivery device to manage biofilm implantrelated infection in spine and lateral femur; Sustained Release Drug Delivery Device to Manage Biofilm Implant-Related Infection.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo:

#### Biosafety Manual:

- On page 68, Step 3 of the biological toxin SOP, delete "with positive airflow." Most BSL-2 labs operate under negative pressure instead, for containment purposes.
- On page 77, PI needs to replace or remove the pictures of the blood draw. Workers should be wearing PPE when interacting with research animals, which is not displayed in these pics.

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 8/27/25.

#### #91-25 Yufeng Huang. To investigate the protective effect BMPEr in kidney fibrosis.

Investigation of mechanisms and treatment for renal fibrosis in animal models.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

#### In SciShield:

- Work with human cell lines must be registered with the IBC. To the table titled "Cell Lines Used in Lab," add human proximal kidney cell line and human glomerular mesangial cell line.
- Edit the Human Source Materials Survey to reflect the work that they are doing with the human cell lines.
- Work with human materials is considered BSL-2. PI needs to change the containment on the project form to BSL-2.
- In the Viral Vector Form for AAV-BMPER, Step 5: safety, in the "Provide details for their method of disinfection" section, PI needs to remove "all injected needles and" so that the statement reads as "Liquid tubes will be decontaminated in a..." All sharps, including injection needles, should immediately be disposed in a sharps container.

#### Biosafety Manual: (From SAM https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/)

The biosafety manual submitted through SAM does not contain an Exposure Control Plan, which is an OSHA requirement for labs working with human cells. The IBC has an ECP Attestation Template they can add to their existing biosafety manual. The 'Laboratory Exposure Control Plan' template can be downloaded from <a href="https://ibc.utah.edu/library/">https://ibc.utah.edu/library/</a> under the Biosafety Manual and Exposure Control Plan Templates. Edit the red, italicized entry on the final page with their lab name and have the lab members familiarize themselves with the document and sign it.

#### Documentation:

- The OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standards requires enrollment in the Hepatitis B and/or Immunocompetence programs when working with human source materials, regardless of vaccination status. Contact Dr. Andy Phillips at Occupational Medicine for access to the health screening questionnaire in Open Range. In the email, provide the lab name and all lab personnel uNIDs to Dr. Phillips. Once contact with Dr. Phillips has been obtained this item is considered complete by the IBC.
- Provide documentation that personnel have completed the EHS Bloodborne Pathogens course within the past year, as determined by their job duties.

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 9/16/25.

#92-25 Aylin Rodan. Molecular mechanisms of WNK-SPAKL/OSR1 regulation of transepithelial ion transport in the Drosophila renal tubule; Probing intracellular CI in a WNK-signaling dependent transporting epithelium; WNK & SPAK/OSR1 regulation of SLC12 cotransporters in Drosophila; Control of Alcohol Responses by Actin-Regulating Genes; Pressure sensing by WNK kinases; Understanding the role of Eyeshut in intestinal homeostasis; Mechanisms of renal epithelial sensing and repsonse to high salt osmotic stress; Transcriptional Regulation of Alcohol Sensitivity and Tolerance; The Genetics of Impulsivity and Motiviation; Genetics of Amphetamine Preference; Control of the renal WNK signaling pathway by phase transitions; Mechanisms of psychostimulant-sleep interations; Sleep Deficits inducedy by Alcohol; Alcohol Tolerance as a Driver of Self-Administration. Human cell lines, plasmids into Drosophila.

They use Drosophila melanogaster to understand ion transport and addiction and reward pathways.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo:

- Biosafety Manual: (From SAM <a href="https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/">https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/</a>)
  - Hepatitis B information needs to be updated. In their Exposure Control Plan, page 8, keep the following information and delete the rest.
    - "Information on hepatitis B vaccinations, including safety, benefits, efficacy, methods of administration, and availability, will be provided to employees during annual Bloodborne Pathogens Training.
       The hepatitis B vaccination series is available at no cost after training and within 10 days of initial assignment to employees identified in the exposure determination section of this plan (section 3.1).
  - Delete pages 20-26 since HepB records are now managed by Occ Med.

#### Documentation:

 PI needs to verify laboratory signage (BSL2/ABSL2 Warning sign) is up to date. Updated signage can be requested on SAM https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/ • Contact Dr. Andy Phillips at Cocupational Medicine for access to the Hepatitis B questionnaire in Open Range. Provide him with the lab name and all lab personnel uNIDs.

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 8/21/25.

# #93-25 Katherine Dowdell. Drinking water microbial community characterization; Drinking water disinfection testing.

Their laboratory will focus on drinking water microbiology and opportunistic pathogens. They will use culture-based methods and DNA & RNA-based methods to characterize drinking water microbial communities and evaluate drinking water treatment strategies for inactivation of opportunistic pathogens.

Outstanding issues to resolve which were communicated to PI through post-review memo:

- Biosafety Manual: (From SAM <a href="https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/">https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/</a>)
  - The IBC has concerns about using glassware to culture risk group 2 bacteria with Ziploc bags as secondary containment. The concern is that if the glass were to break inside a Ziploc bag that it could puncture the bag and leak. Could plasticware with a ziploc be used instead? Or would glassware with a hard walled container, like Tupperware, be feasible instead?

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 9/2/25.

#### #75-25 Christopher Conrady. The immunological response to bacterial and viral infection with the eye.

Outstanding issues to be resolved and were communicated to PI in a post-review memo:

- SciShield https://utah.scishield.com/
  - Provide the location of the ABSL2 procedure and ABSL2 housing locations in the Project Form and the relevant Pathogen and Viral Registration Forms. Confirm and indicate that this space has negative airflow as compared to the adjacent space(s).
  - The IBC accepts the use of surgical masks during pathogen injections outside of the BSC for all but VZV. In the Pathogen Registration Form Virus - Varicella Zoster Virus
    - Include the use of N-95 respirator for all work done outside of a BSC.
    - Contact Dr. Andy Phillips , University of Utah Health Occupational Medicine Team, to initiate the use and fit-testing of N-95 respirator.

## Biosafety Manual:

- Provide an SOP for the use and disinfection of the shared surgical ophthalmic operating microscope that is used for injections. The SOP should include:
  - Indicate that during the injection procedure, personnel access in the procedure room is limited to workers listed on this registration.
  - A description of any equipment covering that will be used to protect the microscope from surface contamination during the procedure.
  - A description of the product and method used for surface decontamination of the microscope. The IBC recommends a decontamination log be kept since this is shared equipment.
  - Considering the potential for the microbial agents to become aerosolized in the procedure space, indicate the protection and disinfection methods used to prevent worker exposure resulting from contact with the eyepieces of the microscope. The IBC recommends use of disposable covers for the eye cups.

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO, ABSO, and subcommittee. Approval granted 9/4/25.

#### **Protocols for Review**

#94-25 MarJanna (MJ) Dahl. Pathogenesis of neonatal chronic lung disease and its co-morbidities. Potential Coxiella Burnetti. BSL2/ABSL2. Renewal.

Pathogenesis of neonatal chronic lung disease and its co-morbidities

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

## • Biosafety Manual:

o On page 13, PI needs to remove the bullet points with Steva Pilato from the "N95 Fitting" section. Fit tests are now scheduled through RedMed, which they have already appropriately indicated.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4 Agent: Potential Coxiella Burnettii
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent □   Replication Competent □   Second Generation □   Third Generation □   Expanded Tropism □   Narrowed Tropism □   Wild Type Tropism □   Wild Type Bacteria □   Antibiotic Resistance □
Risk Assessment: Sharps⊠   Vortexing ⊠   Sonicating□   Cell Sorting□   Centrifuging⊠   Oncogene □ Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet□   Fume Hood⊠   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets⊠   Anaesthetization⊠   Restraints □   Safer Sharps⊠   Enhanced PPE □   Treatment Available ⊠   Vaccine Available □ Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 2 (ABSL-2) Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion
#97-25 Yang Liu. Cas12a2; Eliminate Selective Targets and DNA Damage Repair Response. Lentivirus, Retrovirus, Murine Leukemia Virus. BSL-2+. New Registration.
Their lab studies DNA damage, repair response, and CRISPR proteins.
Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.  • Biosafety Manual:
<ul> <li>On page 14, Appendices 9 and 10 are referenced, but there are no appendices 9 and 10. PI needs to remove this reference.</li> </ul>
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-2, III-D-3, III-E-1 Agent: Lentivirus
Tissue Culture ⊠ Animal Work □
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent ⊠   Replication Competent □   Second Generation □   Third Generation ⊠   Expanded Tropism ⊠   Narrowed Tropism □   Wild Type Tropism □   Antibiotic Resistance □
Transgenes and Sources: Cas9 from S. pyogenes; EGFP from jellyfish; Halotag from E. coli; KRAS, CGAS-GFP/Halo, 53BP1-MScar, H2B-iRFP, MPL, CALR, JAK2 from synthetic
Agent: Retrovirus
Tissue Culture ⊠ Animal Work □
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent ⊠   Replication Competent □   Second Generation □   Third Generation ⊠   Expanded Tropism ⊠   Narrowed Tropism □   Wild Type Tropism □   Antibiotic Resistance □
Transgenes and Sources: Cas9 Fused to EGFP, cGAS-Halotag, EGFP-hcGAS, mScarlet-BP-1 from human source.

Risk Assessment: Sharps□   Vortexing ☒   Sonicating□   Cell Sorting☒   Centrifuging☒   Oncogene □ Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒   Fume Hood☒   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒   Anaesthetization□   Restraints □   Safer Sharps□   Enhanced PPE ☒   Treatment Available ☒   Vaccine Available □ Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach PPE: Solid Front Rear Closing Gown, Double Gloves, Safety Glasses Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 Enhanced (BSL-2+) Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion  #98-25 Xinbo Yang. Electronics Scrap Recycling Advancement Prize (E-SCRAP). Cellulosimicrobium funkei.
BSL-2. New Registration.
The lab investigates bioleaching processes, focusing on the use of microorganisms to extract and recover metals from ores, mine waste, and other secondary resources.
Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.  • SciShield:
<ul> <li>In the table of Bacteria Used in Lab: Add Cellulosimicrobium funkei</li> <li>In the Project Form, Electronics Scrap Recycling Advancement Prize (E-SCRAP):         <ul> <li>Verify the list of personnel is accurate and includes all personnel working with this project.</li> <li>Include, in the checkboxes, the laboratory space WBB 322.</li> <li>If additional rooms/spaces are required, contact the Biosafety Office for assistance.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Add a Pathogen Registration Form for Cellulosimicrobium funkei.</li> <li>Biosafety Manual:</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>In Section E.</li> <li>Include the use of secondary containment while shaking the culture to prevent a spill should a vessel be damaged during shaking, as well as to mitigate aerosol generation.</li> <li>Steps 3 and 5:</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Due to increased toxicity in the presence of arsenic, neither ethanol or bleach are recommended as a disinfectant when gallium arsenic is present in the sample. Pl needs to choose a liquid quaternary ammonium (QUAT) without alcohol as the primary disinfectant. An example, available from Fisher Scientific, is SaniZide Germicidal Solution.</li> <li>Clarify if needles (or other sharps) are used in the procedure. If so, complete the template Annual Review of Safe Sharps as an appendix in the biosafety manual.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Step 6: Clarify if all shaking/incubation steps are conducted in a fume hood.</li> <li>Documentation:</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Due to NIH regulations, the IBC is now required to publish minutes from convened meetings, which they provide on the IBC website <a href="https://ibc.utah.edu/meeting-minutes.php">https://ibc.utah.edu/meeting-minutes.php</a>. PI needs to inform us if their IBC registration contains proprietary information that cannot be included in the minutes.</li> <li>One requirement\ of a BSL2 containment laboratory is the availability of an eye wash station located within the laboratory space. Provide a statement that an OSHA compliant eye wash station is available in the laboratory.</li> <li>Contact Dr. Andy Phillips</li> <li>at Occupational Medicine for enrollment in immunocompetence. Provide him with the lab name and all lab personnel uNIDs.</li> </ul>
University Policy Agent: Cellulosimicrobium funkei Tissue Culture □ Animal Work □ Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent □   Replication Competent ⊠   Second Generation □   Third Generation □   Expanded Tropism □   Narrowed Tropism □   Wild Type Tropism ⊠
Wild Type Bacteria ⊠   Antibiotic Resistance □  Risk Assessment: Sharps□   Vortexing ⊠   Sonicating□   Cell Sorting□   Centrifuging⊠   Oncogene □

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet□   Fume Hood⊠   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets⊠   Anaesthetization□   Restraints □   Safer Sharps□   Enhanced PPE □   Treatment Available □   Vaccine Available □ Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses Motion: Table Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion
#99-25 Sophie Caron. Biased Randomness. Transgenic drosophila BSL-1/ABSL-1. 5-year
Drosophila neuroscience.
Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.  SciShield:  The locations where research is conducted must be included with their registration. PI needs to send a list of Rooms and/or Spaces used along with a brief descriptor of how the space is used (i.e. lab, surgical, cell culture, etc.) to the Biosafety Office at <a href="mailto:biosafety@ehs.utah.edu">biosafety@ehs.utah.edu</a> Documentation:  Due to NIH regulations, the IBC is now required to publish minutes from convened meetings, which they provide on the IBC website <a href="https://ibc.utah.edu/meeting-minutes.php">https://ibc.utah.edu/meeting-minutes.php</a> . PI needs to inform us if their IBC registration contains proprietary information that cannot be included in the minutes.
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4-a Agent: Transgenic drosophila by plasmids Tissue Culture □ Arthropod Work ☒ Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent □   Replication Competent □   Second Generation □   Third Generation □   Expanded Tropism □   Narrowed Tropism □   Wild Type Tropism □   Antibiotic Resistance □   Plasmids ☒   Non-pathogenic ☒ Risk Assessment: Sharps☒   Vortexing ☒   Sonicating□   Cell Sorting□   Centrifuging☒   Oncogene □ Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒   Fume Hood☒   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets□   Anaesthetization☒   Restraints □   Safer Sharps□   Enhanced PPE □   Treatment Available □   Vaccine Available □ Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1) Vote for Motion: 17 For Motion   2 Abstain
#101-25 Chan Yoo. Understand functions of photobodies in chloroplast biogenesis in plants; Investigate functions of phytochrome signaling components in environmental stress adaptation; Identification of novel regulators of the nucleus-to-plastid signaling pathway; Understand the mechanism of chloroplast RNA polymerase complex. Transgenic Plants. BSL-1/BSL-1P. Renewal.
Photobodies are photoreceptors-containing biomolecular condensates that sense light and regulate almost every facet of plant growth and development. Their lab is interested in understanding fundamental functions of photobodies in reprogramming plant growth, development, and chloroplast biogenesis. They particularly focus on the role of photobodies as developmental and environmental sensors in nucleus-chloroplast communication to orchestrate transcriptional regulation in nuclear and plastid genomes.
All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-E-2, III-E-2-a Agent: Agrobacterium tumefaciens with Arabidopsis, Brachypodium, Nicotiana, Solanum, Marchantia Tissue Culture ☑ Plant Work ☑ Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent □   Replication Competent ☑

Second Generation $\Box$   Third Generation $\Box$   Expanded Tropism $\Box$   Narrowed Tropism $\Box$   Wild Type Tropism $\boxtimes$   Antibiotic Resistance $\boxtimes$   Non-pathogenic $\boxtimes$
Risk Assessment: Sharps⊠   Vortexing □   Sonicating□   Cell Sorting□   Centrifuging⊠   Oncogene □ Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet□   Fume Hood⊠   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets□   Anaesthetization□   Restraints □   Safer Sharps□   Enhanced PPE □   Treatment Available □   Vaccine Available □
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Biosafety Level 1 Plant (BSL-1-P)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion
#102-25 Gabrielle Kardon. Viral effects on muscle and muscle regeneration. Ross River Virus. BSL-2+/ABSL-2. Renewal.
The vertebrate musculoskeletal system is essential for structural support and locomotion. It is composed of muscle, which is surrounded by muscle connective tissue and attached via tendons to bone. The broad aim of their laboratory is to understand the molecular mechanisms and cellular interactions regulating musculoskeletal development, regeneration, homeostasis, disease, and evolution. Their research is centered on two components of the musculoskeletal system: muscle and muscle connective tissue (MCT). They focus on the muscle stem cells because they are required for generating muscle (which is post-mitotic) during development, growth, and regeneration. They focus on the MCT because not only is it critical for musculoskeletal form and function, but it provides the molecular and cellular niche within which muscle stem cells reside. The broad goal of their research is to elucidate the role of muscle stem cells, MCT fibroblasts, and muscle/connective tissue interactions during development of the limb and diaphragm, limb and diaphragm congenital defects, muscle regeneration and homeostasis, and musculoskeletal evolution.
PI responded to pre-screen memo and made the requested corrections. During the meeting, there was a discussion on whether or not the PI was performing euthanasia procedures outside of the biosafety cabinet, which is outside of the protocols previously approved. BSO set up a meeting with PI to discuss the concern.
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-3, III-D-4, III-E-1
Agent: Ross River Virus Tissue Culture ⊠ Animal Work ⊠
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent □   Replication Competent □
Second Generation $\square$   Third Generation $\square$   Expanded Tropism $\square$   Narrowed Tropism $\square$   Wild Type Tropism $\square$
Antibiotic Resistance □
Deletions: lox

Insertions: Cre from human sources

Risk Assessment: Sharps⊠ | Vortexing ⊠ | Sonicating□ | Cell Sorting⊠ | Centrifuging⊠ | Oncogene □

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet ⊠ | Fume Hood ⊠ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets ⊠ | Anaesthetization ⊠ |

Restraints □ | Safer Sharps ⊠ | Enhanced PPE ⊠ | Treatment Available ⊠ | Vaccine Available □

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach

PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses

Motion: Table

Vote for Motion: 18 For Motion | 1 Abstain

#### #103-25 Crystal Davies (Hicks). Transgenic Core. BSL-1/ABSL-1.

They provide services to generate transgenic and gene targeted mice for research groups. They provide all related services including freezing sperm and embryos, in vitro fertilization, rederiving mouse lines, generation of iPS cells.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised at the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4, III-D-4-a, III-D-4-c-(2), III-E-3

Agent: Plasmids into mouse embryo

Second General Antibiotic Resis Risk Assessment Risk Mitigation: B Restraints Disinfectant: Fres PPE: Laboratory Motion: Approve	Animal Work   stics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain   Replication Incompetent   Replication Competent   ation   Third Generation   Expanded Tropism   Narrowed Tropism   Wild Type Tropism   stance   Plasmid   Non-pathogenic   Sharps   Vortexing   Sonicating   Cell Sorting   Centrifuging   Oncogene   iosafety Cabinet   Fume Hood   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets   Anaesthetization     Safer Sharps   Enhanced PPE   Treatment Available   Vaccine Available   hly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses with contingencies at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1) 7 For Motion   2 Abstain
Protocols for Re	view, Requiring IBC Notice Simultaneous with Initiation
	e. Characterization of interactions between Sodalis praecaptivus and grain weevils. Sodalis ansgenic weevils. BSL1/ABSL1. Renewal.
Studying interaction the genus Sitophi	ons between bacterial endosymbionts and their insect hosts - currently focusing on grain weevils of lus.
Outstanding issu	ues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.
∘ Ir	<ul> <li>the Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules Survey:</li> <li>Exempt Question #8: Update to 'Yes' and include reference to Appendix C-II, Use of E. coli K-12 host-vector systems.</li> </ul>
	y Manual:
th fo	hroughout the manual, references to cleaning with 'Clorox followed by ethanol' are found. Update nese descriptions throughout the manual to reference using a freshly prepared 1:10 dilution of bleach bllowed by a water rinse. A final rinse with ethanol can be used if desired. This will prevent a potentia azardous mix of bleach and ethanol.
0 P	Provide SOPs for experimental procedures in Section D.3 (Experimental Standard Operating Procedures) or attach the SOP(s) as an appendix to the manual.
	<ul> <li>An SOP for the injection of bacteria into weevils and subsequent weevil processing was provided in BioRaft in 2017. If this reflects current work practice, insert into Section D.3. of the lab manual (Experimental Standard Operating Procedures) to facilitate this and future IBC reviews.</li> </ul>
	Delete Section I 'Experimental Procedures' as this section has been updated with the current revision and is now located in section D.3.
<ul> <li>Documer</li> </ul>	
th	Due to NIH regulations, the IBC is now required to publish minutes from convened meetings, which mey provide on the IBC website <a href="https://ibc.utah.edu/meeting-minutes.php">https://ibc.utah.edu/meeting-minutes.php</a> . PI needs to inform us if
o T e	neir IBC registration contains proprietary information that cannot be included in the minutes. The biosafety manual requires annual review by PI and lab staff. The manual was last reviewed in arly August 2024 and the annual review for 2025 is now due. PI and all staff should review and sign ne biosafety manual attestation roster.
	lelines: III-D-4, III-E raecaptivus in weevils
Tissue Culture	·
	stics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain $\square$   Replication Incompetent $\square$   Replication Competent $\boxtimes$

Second Generation  $\square$  | Third Generation  $\square$  | Expanded Tropism  $\square$  | Narrowed Tropism  $\square$  | Wild Type Tropism  $\boxtimes$  |

Antibiotic Resistance ☐   Non-pathogenic ☒ Risk Assessment: Sharps☐   Vortexing ☒   Sonicating☐   Cell Sorting☐   Centrifuging☒   Oncogene ☐ Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒   Fume Hood☒   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☐   Anaesthetization☐   Restraints ☐   Safer Sharps☐   Enhanced PPE ☐   Treatment Available ☐   Vaccine Available ☐ Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1) Vote for Motion: 17 For Motion   2 Abstain
Protocols for Review, Requiring IBC Approval Before Initiation, Transfer of rsNA into Humans
#104-25 J. Singleton. A multicenter Phase 1 / 2 double-blind, randomized, sham-controlled dose escalation study to determine safety and tolerability of single dose intrathecal ST-503 gene therapy for refractory pain due to peripheral neuropathy (small fiber predominant, SFN)
PI is still addressing the post-review memo.  Agent Information:
<ul> <li>Update Q2b to remove 'Adenoviral vector' as this system does not include an adenoviral vector helper virus.</li> <li>Update Q6. Change containment to BSL1.</li> </ul> Agent Administration:
<ul> <li>Q5 indicates use of an 18G needle to withdraw 1ml of ST-503 DP. Q10 indicates the administration uses a 22G stainless-steel spinal needle. Describe the procedure for switching needles and appropriate disposal of sharps, indicating details for the safe handling of sharps.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Risk Assessment:</li> <li>Update Question 2 to yes to include risks to Caregivers resulting from potential viral shedding, as described elsewhere in this registration.</li> </ul>
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-C Agent: ST-503-AAV
Tissue Culture □ Animal Work □ Human Gene Transfer ⊠  Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain □   Replication Incompetent ⊠   Replication Competent □    Second Generation □   Third Generation ⊠   Expanded Tropism ⊠   Narrowed Tropism □   Wild Type Tropism □    Antibiotic Resistance □
Risk Assessment: Sharps   Vortexing   Sonicating   Cell Sorting   Centrifuging   Oncogene   Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet   Fume Hood   Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets   Anaesthetization   Restraints   Safer Sharps   Enhanced PPE   Treatment Available   Vaccine Available   Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) Vote for Motion: 15 For Motion   Abstain
Pending Protocols
None
Lab/Protocol Closures
None

**Spills and Incidents** 

None

## **Other Business**

NIH announcement regarding the modernizing of biosafety framework.

Meeting concluded at 12:15 PM

Next IBC meeting will be held on October 16, 2025