THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

**INSTITUTIONAL BIOSAFETY COMMITTEE**
**MEETING MINUTES**

August 21, 2025
Meeting was convened at 11:00 AM
Hybrid Meeting

Voting Members Present:
☒Cecilia Gerstner (IBC Chair)
☒Jeff Clifford (IBC Vice Chair)
☒Debbie Eckert (BSO)
☒Chris Hunter (ABSO)
☒Isaac Martineau (BS Specialist)
☒Ricky Bell (IBC Member)
☒Neil Bowles (IBC Member)
☒Jessica Brown (IBC Member)
☒Allison Carey (IBC Member)
☒Scott Cho (IBC Member)
☐David Gillespie (IBC Member)
☐Talia Karasov (Plant Expert)
☐John Kriesel (HGT Expert)
☒Karla McHale (IBC Member)
☒Bart Mickelsen (IBC Member)
☒Kate Modzelewska (IBC Member)
☒Andy Phillips (IBC Member)
☒Robert Sperling (IBC Member)
☒Alton Swennes (Animal Expert)
☒David Thomas (IBC Member)
☒Michael Voight (IBC Member)
☐Tom Wachter (IBC Member)
☒Zemin Zhou (IBC Member)
☒Wendy Zhu (IBC Member)

Quorum was present; 7 are required to conduct business.

**<u>Conflict of Interest Declaration</u>**

None declared

**<u>Review of July 17, 2025 Minutes</u>**

Motion: **Approve**
Vote for Motion: 16 in favor of the motion
3 Abstain

**<u>Old Business</u>**

**#66-23.01 Jessica Brown. Amendment to add new project titled *Field Collection of Cryptococcus neoformans.* BSL-2+.**

PI is still addressing the post-review.

**#79-25 Gianna Hammer. Antigen Presenting Cells and Inflammation.**

They are a mucosal immunologists and a “gut lab”. Bottom line, if it lives, visits, or is influenced by the gut, then this is something they want to understand. As PI of the Hammer lab, I view the gut as an “untapped resource” from which to glean information about host-microbe interactions, the balance that enables peace with microbiota, and also, how the balance must be swayed to battle against pathogens and cancer. They have ongoing research programs investigating immune dynamics in the healthy gut, the inflamed gut, the pathogen-infected gut, and colorectal cancer.

PI has not responded to post-review memo. Reminder email sent 9/10/25.

**<u>Protocols for Review</u>**

**#87-25 Dustin Williams. Development of an Antimicrobial Pouch to Prevent Biofilm Implant-related Infection; Development of a Reloadable Antimicrobial Pouch to Prevent Biofilm Implant-Related Infection; BSL-2 Work in BBRL Lab (BPRB Room 249); Waxworm Infection Model; Sustained release drug delivery device to manage**

**biofilm implantrelated infection in spine and lateral femur; Sustained Release Drug Delivery Device to Manage Biofilm Implant-Related Infection.**

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo:

- **Biosafety Manual:**
  - On page 68, Step 3 of the biological toxin SOP, delete "with positive airflow." Most BSL-2 labs operate under negative pressure instead, for containment purposes.
  - On page 77, please replace or remove the pictures of [redacted]. Workers should be wearing PPE [redacted], which is not displayed in these pics.

Agent: Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Antibiotic Resistance ☐

Agent: Staphylococcus aureus, Methicillin Resistance
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Antibiotic Resistance ☒

Agent: Other risk group 2 agents: MSSA, Acinetobacter baumanni, Bacillus, E. coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Lactobacillus, Pseudomonas, Serratia marcescens, Staphylococcus epidermidis, Streptococcus, Cutibacterium acnes
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☐
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Antibiotic Resistance ☐

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☒ | Cell Sorting☒ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☒ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ | Restraints ☒ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☒ | Vaccine Available ☐
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 2 (ABSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 17 For Motion | 2 Abstain

**#89-25 Owen Chan. Mechanisms of Counteregulatory Failure; The use of Low Dose Beta Blockers to Improve Hypoglycemia Awareness; Mechanisms Linking Glycemic Control to COVID-19 Outcomes in Diabetic Patients; Evaluating a New Somatostatin Receptor 2 Antagonist on Glucagon Secretion in T1DM.**

Intensive insulin therapy is effective at reducing the risk of long-term complications in patients with diabetes, but it is often associated with the development of low blood sugar attacks or "hypoglycemia". Their research primarily investigates the signaling mechanisms used by the brain to detect hypoglycemia and ascertain how these signals stimulate the release of specific hormones from peripheral tissues to counter the fall in blood glucose. In addition, the projects explore other aspects of brain metabolism such as the potential use of alternate fuels as well as making attempts to measure these fuel stores in the brain. The overall hypothesis of the project is that prior exposure to hypoglycemia and/or diabetes may cause adaptations in the brain that prevent it from sensing a fall in blood glucose concentrations and hence, impair its ability to initiate an appropriate hormone response to counter that fall. The benefit of this work is its contribution to their understanding of brain metabolism and specifically, the processes that may become defective with the onset of diabetes. Understanding the underlying mechanisms involved in glucose regulation will help in the future development of therapies designed to protect the human brain during severe hypoglycemia.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-3, III-D-4-a, III-D-4-c-(2), III-E-3
Agent: AAV
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☒|
Risk Group 2 ☐ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: GAD65, GLUT1, FLT-1, GLAST, MCT1, MCT2, eNpHR-3.0, ChR2 from rat

Agent: Lentivirus
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☒ | Expanded Tropism ☒ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐|
Risk Group 2 ☒ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: Insulin Receptor, PTP1b from rat.

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☐ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ |
Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☒ | Vaccine Available ☐
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 Stepdown (ABSL-1+)
Vote for Motion: 18 For Motion | 1 Abstain

**#90-25 Mingnan Chen. Developing immunotherapeutics for cancer and autoimmune diseases.**

The goal of their lab is to develop new pharmaceutical formulations for peptide vaccines and immunotherapeutic.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-B-1, III-D-1, III-D-2, III-D-3, III-E
Agent: Pertussis Toxin, PD-1 Diphtheria Toxin
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent: Lentivirus
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☒ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☒ | Wild Type Tropism ☐|
Risk Group 2 ☒ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: scFv of anti mouse PD-1

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☒ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☒ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☐ |
Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☒ | Vaccine Available ☐
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 Stepdown (ABSL-1+)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#91-25 Yufeng Huang. To investigate the protective effect BMPEr in kidney fibrosis.**

Investigation of mechanisms and treatment for renal fibrosis in animal models.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

- **In SciShield:**

- Work with human cell lines must be registered with the IBC. To the table titled “Cell Lines Used in Lab,” add human proximal kidney cell line and human glomerular mesangial cell line.
- Edit the Human Source Materials Survey to reflect the work that you are doing with the human cell lines.
- Work with human materials is considered BSL-2. Please change the containment on the project form to BSL-2.
- In the Viral Vector Form for AAV-BMPER, Step 5: safety, in the “Provide details for your method of disinfection” section, please remove “all injected needles and” so that the statement reads as “*Liquid tubes will be decontaminated in a…”* All sharps, including injection needles, should immediately be disposed in a sharps container.

- **Biosafety Manual: (From SAM https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/)**
  The biosafety manual submitted through SAM does not contain an Exposure Control Plan, which is an OSHA requirement for labs working with human cells. The IBC has an ECP Attestation Template you can add to your existing biosafety manual. The ‘Laboratory Exposure Control Plan’ template can be downloaded from https://ibc.utah.edu/library/ under the Biosafety Manual and Exposure Control Plan Templates. Edit the red, italicized entry on the final page with your lab name and have the lab members familiarize themselves with the document and sign it.
- **Documentation:**
  - **The OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standards requires enrollment in the Hepatitis B and/or Immunocompetence programs when working with human source materials, regardless of vaccination status. Contact Dr. Andy Phillips [redacted] at Occupational Medicine for access to the health screening questionnaire in Open Range. In the email, provide the lab name and all lab personnel uNIDs to Dr. Phillips. Once contact with Dr. Phillips has been obtained this item is considered complete by the IBC.**
  - **Provide documentation that personnel have completed the EHS Bloodborne Pathogens course within the past year, as determined by their job duties.**

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4-a
Agent: AAV
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☒| Risk Group 2 ☐ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: BMPER from mouse source; AAVrh10 from viral source.

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☐ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ | Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☐ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☐ | Vaccine Available ☐
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#92-25 Aylin Rodan. Molecular mechanisms of WNK-SPAKL/OSR1 regulation of transepithelial ion transport in the Drosophila renal tubule; Probing intracellular Cl in a WNK-signaling dependent transporting epithelium; WNK & SPAK/OSR1 regulaiton of SLC12 cotransporters in Drosophila; Control of Alcohol Responses by Actin-Regulating Genes; Pressure sensing by WNK kinases; Understanding the role of Eyeshut in intestinal homeostasis; Mechanisms of renal epithelial sensing and repsonse to high salt osmotic stress; Transcriptional Regulation of Alcohol Sensitivity and Tolerance; The Genetics of Impulsivity and Motiviation; Genetics of Amphetamine Preference; Control of the renal WNK signaling pathway by phase transitions; Mechanisms of psychostimulant-sleep interations; Sleep Deficits inducedy by Alcohol; Alcohol Tolerance as a Driver of Self-Administration. Human cell lines, plasmids into Drosophila.**

They use Drosophila melanogaster to understand ion transport and addiction and reward pathways.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo:

- **Biosafety Manual: (From SAM https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/)**

- Hepatitis B information needs to be updated. In your Exposure Control Plan, page 8, keep the following information and delete the rest.
    - "Information on hepatitis B vaccinations, including safety, benefits,efficacy, methods of administration, and availability, will be provided to employees during annual Bloodborne Pathogens Training. The hepatitis B vaccination series is available at no cost after training and within 10 days of initial assignment to employees identified in the exposure determination section of this plan (section 3.1). "
- Delete pages 20-26 since HepB records are now managed by Occ Med.
- **Documentation:**
  - Please verify laboratory signage (BSL2/ABSL2 Warning sign) is up to date. Updated signage can be requested on SAM https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/
  - Contact Dr. Andy Phillips [redacted] at Occupational Medicine for access to the Hepatitis B questionnaire in Open Range. Provide him with the lab name and all lab personnel uNIDs.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4-a, III-E
Agent: Human Cells
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☐
Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☐ | Fume Hood☐ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ | Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☐ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☐ | Vaccine Available ☒
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#93-25 Katherine Dowdell. Drinking water microbial community characterization; Drinking water disinfection testing.**

Their laboratory will focus on drinking water microbiology and opportunistic pathogens. They will use culture-based methods and DNA & RNA-based methods to characterize drinking water microbial communities and evaluate drinking water treatment strategies for inactivation of opportunistic pathogens.

Outstanding issues to resolve which were communicated to PI through post-review memo:

- **Biosafety Manual: (From SAM https://sam.ehs.utah.edu/ehsa/)**
  - The IBC has concerns about using glassware to culture risk group 2 bacteria with Ziploc bags as secondary containment. The concern is that if the glass were to break inside a Ziploc bag that it could puncture the bag and leak. Could plasticware with a ziploc be used instead? Or would glassware with a hard walled container, like Tupperware, be feasible instead?

Agent: Mycobacteria avium, Legionella neumophila, Vermamoeba mermiformis, Acanthomoeba castellanii
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☐
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Risk Group 2 ☒ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Risk Assessment: Sharps☐ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☐ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☐ | Anaesthetization☐ | Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☒ | Vaccine Available ☐
Discussion: PI needs to get a centrifuge with either a sealed rotor or safety buckets. Member of IBC volunteered to work with PI to secure a proper centrifuge for their work.
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#03-21.01 James Gagnon Amendment to add Snakehead Virus to Zebrafish embryo. BSL2/ABSL-1**

Their lab tries to understand vertebrate embryogenesis and adult tissue homeostasis through the lens of the lineage tree. The lineage tree is the branching structure of cell divisions that describes relationships between all cells in the adult animal, and connects these cells to their ancestor cells in the embryo. They have developed tools to record this lineage tree, with unprecedented scale and granularity, using genome editing and sequencing. Their lab studies variability in the vertebrate lineage tree - how it is compensated for and how it can lead to individuality. Their lab is interested in cell signaling pathways, and how they influence cell fate choice at critical branch points within the tree. Finally, their lab researches how stem cells contribute to tissue maintenance and regeneration, particularly in the blood and in the germ line. Their lab addresses these topics using genome engineering, sequencing and synthetic biology in the zebrafish, a great model of vertebrate biology. They also study the transcriptional, cellular, and organismal responses to viral infection in larval zebrafish

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4-a
Agent: Snakehead rhabdovirus
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☒ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☒|
Risk Group 2 ☐ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☒ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☐ |
Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☐ | Vaccine Available ☐
Discussion: Low risk protocol that is up for renewal in 4 months. The committee agreed to treat this as a renewal instead of amendment. New IBC protocol #100-25.
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 Stepdown (ABSL-1+)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#168-22.02 Tyler Starr. Amendment to add 1) recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus, and 2) DNA from truncated single genes from Junin virus, EBOV, and MARV into saccharomyces cerevisiae for yeast display.**

They study molecular evolution at the host-virus interface, where specific protein-protein interactions drive rapid evolution of viral surface proteins, the host receptors that they bind, and the antibodies that inhibit these interactions. They leverage a combination of evolutionary, biochemical, and virological approaches to connect the functional effects of amino acid mutations to their biophysical origins and evolutionary consequences. Their basic studies of protein evolution shed light on important phenotypes in virology and immunity, from viral zoonosis to the development of broadly protective antibodies. They are building off current projects on SARS-CoV-2 and HIV to develop a broad research program studying diverse emerging viruses of public health interest.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-2
Agent: Vesicular Stomatitis Virus
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☐
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐|
Risk Group 2 ☐ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: Clade 2 sarbecovirus spike, miniTurbo, luciferase, eGFP from bacterial or viral sources

Risk Assessment: Sharps☐ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☒ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☒ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☐ |
Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☐ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☐ | Vaccine Available ☐

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#05-24.01 Kaitlin Basham. Amendment to add Lentivirus and Cholera Toxin.**

Their broad research interests are aimed at understanding mechanisms that drive the initiation and evolution of cancer in order to develop more effective therapies. Specifically, their studies focus on mechanisms important during normal development, aging, and tumorigenesis in the adrenal cortex, which is an essential endocrine organ responsible for steroid hormone production. They aim to understand the cellular and molecular mechanisms that control adrenal gland development and organ maintenance, and how dysregulation of these processes contributes to adrenocortical carcinoma (ACC), which is a highly aggressive form of cancer with few effective treatments. They use a combination of in vitro and in vivo approaches to study ACC

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-3, III-D-4, III-E-1
Agent: Cholera Toxin
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent: Lentivirus
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☒ | Expanded Tropism ☒ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐|
Risk Group 2 ☒ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: LUC2-mCherry from synthetic sources

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☒ | Fume Hood☒ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ |
Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☐ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☒ | Vaccine Available ☐
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 Stepdown (ABSL-1+)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**#95-24.01 Russ Butterfield. Amendment to add AAV into mouse model.**

Clinical testing, genetic research, clinical trials.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.
PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4, III-D-4-a
Agent: AAV
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☒ | Replication Competent ☐ |
Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☒ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐|
Risk Group 2 ☐ | Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: Col6A1

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☐ | Fume Hood☐ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ |
Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☐ | Vaccine Available ☐
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

**<u>Protocols for Review, Requiring IBC Approval Before Initiation, Transfer of rsNA into Humans</u>**

#88-25 Aimee Hersh. (IBC_00000390) Cabaletta: A Phase 1/2, Open-Label Study to Evaluate the Safety and Efficacy of Autologous CD19-specific Chimeric Antigen Receptor T cells (CABA-201) in Subjects with Active Idiopathic Inflammatory Myopathy or Active Juvenile Idiopathic Inflammatory Myopathy.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-C
Agents: CD19
Risk Assessment: Sharps X | Vortexing ☐| Sonicating☐| Cell Sorting☐| Centrifuging☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☐| Fume Hood☐| Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☐| Anaesthetization☐| Safer Sharps X
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 10 For Motion
14 Abstain

**<u>Pending Protocols</u>**

**#75-25 Christopher Conrady. The immunological response to bacterial and viral infection with the eye.**

Outstanding issues to be resolved and were communicated to PI in a post-review memo:

- **SciShield [https://utah.scishield.com/](https://utah.scishield.com/)**
    - Provide the location of the ABSL2 procedure and ABSL2 housing locations in the Project Form and the relevant Pathogen and Viral Registration Forms. Confirm and indicate that this space has negative airflow as compared to the adjacent space(s).
    - The IBC accepts the use of surgical masks during pathogen injections outside of the BSC for all but VZV. In the Pathogen Registration Form Virus - Varicella Zoster Virus
        - Include the use of N-95 respirator for all work done outside of a BSC.
        - Contact Dr. Andy Phillips [redacted], University of Utah Health Occupational Medicine Team, to initiate the use and fit-testing of N-95 respirator.
- **Biosafety Manual:**
    - Provide an SOP for the use and disinfection of the shared surgical ophthalmic operating microscope that is used for injections. The SOP should include:
        - Indicate that during the injection procedure, personnel access in the procedure room is limited to workers listed on this registration.
        - A description of any equipment covering that will be used to protect the microscope from surface contamination during the procedure.
        - A description of the product and method used for surface decontamination of the microscope. The IBC recommends a decontamination log be kept since this is shared equipment.
        - Considering the potential for the microbial agents to become aerosolized in the procedure space, indicate the protection and disinfection methods used to prevent worker exposure resulting from contact with the eyepieces of the microscope. The IBC recommends use of disposable covers for the eye cups.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-3, III-D-4, III-D-4-b
Agent: Risk Group 2 Bacteria, Staphylococcus epidermidis and aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae and pyogenes.

Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☒| Antibiotic Resistance ☐

Agent: Enterotoxin
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒

Agent: Varicella Zoster Virus
Tissue Culture ☐ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☒ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☒| Antibiotic Resistance ☐

Agent: Herpes Simplex 1 and 2
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☐ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Antibiotic Resistance ☐

Agent: Vesicular stomatitis virus.
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☒
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☒ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☐ | Expanded Tropism ☐ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Antibiotic Resistance ☐

Agent: Lentivirus
Tissue Culture ☒ Animal Work ☐
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain ☐ | Replication Incompetent ☐ | Replication Competent ☒ | Second Generation ☐ | Third Generation ☒ | Expanded Tropism ☒ | Narrowed Tropism ☐ | Wild Type Tropism ☐| Antibiotic Resistance ☐
Transgenes and Sources: UNC93B1, TLR-3, IRF-3 from mouse sources.

Risk Assessment: Sharps☒ | Vortexing ☒ | Sonicating☐ | Cell Sorting☐ | Centrifuging☒ | Oncogene ☐
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet☐ | Fume Hood☒ | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets☒ | Anaesthetization☒ | Restraints ☐ | Safer Sharps☒ | Enhanced PPE ☐ | Treatment Available ☒ | Vaccine Available ☒
Safety Discussion: PI is unable to fit equipment into a BSC. Alternative method discussed which allows injections to be performed outside of a biosafety cabinet, if the room it is being performed in is limited to essential personnel wearing respirators. Fit test and medical surveillance necessary for the laboratory workers involved.
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 2 (ABSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 18 For Motion | 1 Abstain

**Lab/Protocol Closures**

None

**Spills and Incidents**

None

**Other Business**

Reminder regarding STEM Safety Day IBC Panel

Meeting concluded at 11:53 AM

Next IBC meeting will be held on September 18, 2025