

November 20, 2025
Meeting was convened at 11:00 AM
Hybrid Meeting

Voting Members Present:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Scott Cho (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Alton Swennes (Animal Expert)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cecilia Gerstner (IBC Chair)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> David Gillespie (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> David Thomas (IBC Member)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jeff Clifford (IBC Vice Chair)	<input type="checkbox"/> Talia Karasov (Plant Expert)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Michael Voight (IBC Member)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Debbie Eckert (BSO)	<input type="checkbox"/> John Kriesel (HGT Expert)	<input type="checkbox"/> Tom Wachter (IBC Member)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chris Hunter (ABSO)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Karla McHale (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Zemin Zhou (IBC Member)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Isaac Martineau (BS Specialist)	<input type="checkbox"/> Bart Mickelsen (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Wendy Zhu (IBC Member)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ricky Bell (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kate Modzelewska (IBC Member)	
<input type="checkbox"/> Neil Bowles (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Andy Phillips (IBC Member)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Jessica Brown (IBC Member)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Robert Sperling (IBC Member)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Allison Carey (IBC Member)		

Quorum was present; 7 are required to conduct business.

Conflict of Interest Declaration

None

Review of October 16, 2025 Minutes

Motion: **Approve**
Vote for Motion: 16 in favor of the motion
3 Abstain

Old Business

#79-25 Gianna Hammer. Antigen Presenting Cells and Inflammation.

PI has not responded to post-review memo. Reminder email sent 9/10/25, 10/15/25.

#96-25 Colin Dale. Characterization of interactions between *Sodalis praecaptivus* and grain weevils. *Sodalis praecaptivus*, transgenic weevils. BSL1/ABSL1. Renewal.

Studying interactions between bacterial endosymbionts and their insect hosts - currently focusing on grain weevils of the genus *Sitophilus*.

PI has not responded to post-review memo. Reminder email sent 10/9/25, 11/13/25.

#99-25 Sophie Caron. Biased Randomness. Transgenic *drosophila* BSL-1/ABSL-1. 5-year

Drosophila neuroscience.
PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 11/17/25.

#110-25 Peter Shen. Characterization of the p97 AAA ATPase; Structural studies of ribosome customization by viral kinases. *Vaccinia virus* (vaccine strain). BSL-2. Renewal.

They are a basic research lab that characterizes endogenous protein complexes for biochemical studies. Their focus is on eukaryotic proteins, including those derived from budding yeast and human cell lines. They also do work with

recombinant expression of proteins in common bacteria lab strains. Their expertise is in structural biology, primarily with the use of electron microscopes to visualize the samples they isolate.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

Biosafety Manual:

- In the Decontamination and Waste Disposal section of the Working with Vaccinia Virus SOP: In the statement *'All reusable equipment (centrifuge rotors, racks, forceps) must be disinfected with Cavicide or 10% bleach and rinsed with 70% ethanol after contact time.'* add a water rinse step in between the bleach and ethanol steps to avoid chemical incompatibility. (pg12)
- Do they use any human cells outside of the biosafety cabinet for microscopy, vitrification, etc.? If so, they must adopt the attached SOP for use of human cells outside of a BSC. The key is pathogen testing to decrease risk of exposure to human pathogens. PI needs to insert this SOP into their biosafety manual.

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 11/04/25.

#112-25 Joseph Palatinus. Targeting Protein Trafficking in Arrhythmogenic cardiomyopathy; Mechanisms of inflammation in arrhythmogenic cardiomyopathy. AAV, Coxsackie Virus. BSL-2/ABSL-2. Renewal.

The Palatinus Lab is focused on Noncanonical roles of the C-terminus of Connexin 43 and the alternatively translated products of this protein and specifically their role in trafficking. Additional focus has been on rescuing arrhythmogenic phenotypes by targeting protein trafficking. They utilize state-of-the art molecular biology techniques to address these questions.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

SciShield:

- In the Viral Vector Registration Form-AAV9-pCMV spike, Step 5 Safety:
 - Remove 'vinyl gloves' from the registration
 - Update PPE to include Nitrile Gloves, Eye Protection and Laboratory Coat.

Biosafety Manual:

- Appendix 2: Coxsackie Virus B3 Post-exposure Standard Operating Procedure:
 - Update the question Is this agent replication-defective? To be 'no' as this virus is replication competent.
- Appendix 5: Coxsackie B3 Protocol:
 - Provide details describing how the work is conducted safely with sharps to avoid a percutaneous injury or exposure to personnel.
 - Indicate the precautions taken during IP injection with the insulin needles and during the use of sharps in the dissection of viral infected heart tissue.
 - Indicate the disinfection procedures for the use of non-disposable sharps in this protocol.

Documentation:

- Due to work with viral vectors, provide documentation that personnel have completed the Viral Vector Training within the 3 years, as determined by their job duties.
 - [REDACTED]

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 11/04/25.

#43-23.02 Josh Steffen (SRI Labs). Amendment to add project: Defining Molecular Determinants of Survival and Persistence in Clinical Isolates of Gram-Negative Pathogens. BSL2.

The Science Research Initiative (SRI) program offers College of Science students the opportunity to participate in discovery-based scientific research starting their first day on campus, with no prior research experience required. They will gain research skills that will help them in science classes, learn with College of Science peers, and connect with faculty across the University. The SRI will jumpstart their path of academic success, and give them needed skills to prepare for an internship or a career - whether that's in a research lab, an office, or one of the many other opportunities open to their graduates.

Outstanding issues to be resolved which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

SciShield:

- Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules Survey:
 - Because they are introducing recombinant DNA from risk group 2 organisms (ExPEC) into a nonpathogenic prokaryote (K12 E. coli), they must answer Question 5 as 'yes.'
- Pathogen Registration Form (Bacteria – Extraintestinal Pathogenic Escherichia coli (ExPEC)):
 - Step III: Safety. The form indicates 'yes' for use of a Class II Biological Safety Cabinet. If they are conducting any work with these pathogens outside of a BSC, they must answer 'no' to this question and then specify what work is done in the cabinet and what work is done outside of the cabinet.

Documentation:

- Enrollment in the Occupational Medicine Immunocompetence Program is being extended to the undergraduate students participating in the 'Defining Molecular Determinants of Survival and Persistence in Clinical Isolates of Gram-Negative Pathogens' project. Contact Dr. Andy Phillips [REDACTED] at Occupational Medicine for student enrollment in the Immunocompetence Program. In the email, provide the lab name and all student uNIDs to Dr. Phillips.

Laboratory and Training:

- Members of the IBC will request a meeting with the SRI team to review the laboratory facilities and training provided to the students to confirm safe work with the bacterial pathogens.

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 11/04/25.

#47-25.02 Jason Shepherd. Amendment to add lentivirus.

Brains have an amazing ability to learn and store information for long periods - in some cases, a lifetime. A major challenge in neuroscience is to understand how neuronal networks are sculpted by experience and how proteins/genes contribute to circuit modification. The goal of their research is to understand information storage, from the molecular level and gene program, through in vivo neuronal networks, and how these processes go awry in neurological disorders. Their lab utilizes coordinated biochemical, cell biological, electrophysiological and imaging studies both in vitro and in vivo.

Outstanding issues to be addressed which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

SciShield

- In the Viral Vector Registration Form-Cas13-sgRNA Lenti
 - Step 5 Safety: Remove the sentence 'Insertional mutagenesis is of low risk.'

Biosafety Manual:

- In the Lentivirus injection into animal model protocol:
 - To reduce exposure to infectious sharps, revise the statement 'Each glass needle is disposable and will be bleached in 1:10 dilution of fresh bleach before being placed into the sharp disposal biohazardous waste' to indicate direct disposal of the sharp into biohazardous waste (i.e. sharps container) directly, without disinfection in bleach solution. (pg 74).

PI responded to post-review memo. Responses were evaluated by BSO and ABSO. Approval granted 10/20/25.

Protocols for Review With 3 Year Approval

#117-25 Fiona McDonnell. Exosomes and Conventional Outflow Homeostasis; Reversing ECM changes using EVs. Lentivirus, Adenovirus. BSL-2/ABSL-1+. Renewal.

They are interested in how nanovesicles called exosomes are regulating extracellular matrix materials in glaucoma. They use human donor cells and tissues to obtain exosomes for comparison. To analyze the exosomes they use a range of methods including microbiology, proteomics, biomedical engineering and imaging.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-3, III-D-4, III-D-4-a, III-D-4-b, III-E-1

Agent: Adenovirus

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: BETA-2; TGFB2 from human sources

Agent: Lentivirus

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: GFP and RFP from human sources

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization |
Restrains | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach

PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses

Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 Stepdown (ABSL-1+)

Vote for Motion: 18 For Motion | 1 Abstain

#120-25 Benjamin Spike. Coordination of stress-adaptive cell states by CRIPTO in breast cancer heterogeneity and progression.

Principally focusing on breast cancer, they use a combination of molecular genetic tools, tissue culture systems, mouse models, functional genomics and bioinformatic approaches to study stem cell and cancer cell biology at the single cell and systems level. They are particularly interested in molecular basis of stem cell stress responses, plasticity and heterogeneity as they are likely to be of critical importance for the development of effective cancer therapeutic strategies and for strategies in tissue engineering, tissue repair and aging.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-4-a, III-D-4-c-(2), III-E-1, III-E-3

Agent: Lentivirus

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: Cre; GFP; mCherry from synthetic sources

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization |
Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 Enhanced (BSL-2+) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)
Vote for Motion: 18 For Motion | 1 Abstain

#122-25 Christopher Gregg. Noncoding Elements Shaping Brain Aging; Gene regulatory mechanisms connecting metabolism and Alzheimer's Disease (Coordinator Element); Neuropixels Recording of Foraging Behavior; Hibernation Hub Gene CRISPRi.

Their lab studies genetic and epigenetic mechanisms that influence brain development and disease in mice and humans. They perform histology, behavior analysis, cell culture and molecular and biochemical experiments, as well computational studies.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-4-a, III-D-4-c-(2), III-E-1, III-E-3

Agent: AAV

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: Cre Recombinase, eGFP, sgRNAs from synthetic sources

Agent: Lentivirus

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: Zim3 KRAB-dCas9, GFP, Abca7 sgRNA from animal sources

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization |
Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach

PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses

Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)

Vote for Motion: 17 For Motion | 2 Abstain

#123-25 Colin Maguire. Nucleic Acid Extractio from Human blood and tissue; Induced pluripotent stem cells; Gene Editing in Human Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells; Isolating PBMCs and Plasma from Covid-19 blood samples; Extracting DNA from Covid-19-positive saliva samples; Extracting DNA from blood from HIV-positive patients; DNA extraction of Coccidiodes Fungus; Storage of Cell line and Vaccine Vector in Biorepository; Immortalize Creatine Transporter Deficient Primary Fibroblast; Tocilizumab in Lung Transplantation.

As part of the department of Clinical Translational Science Institute, the Cellular Translational Research Core provides molecular biology services to investigators at the University of Utah. Their main specialty is nucleic acid extraction and human-derived iPSCs generation.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-1, III-D-3, III-E

Agent: Lentivirus

Tissue Culture Animal Work
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance
Transgenes and Sources: CMV, SV40T from human sources

Agent: Sendai
Tissue Culture Animal Work
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance
Transgenes and Sources: Oct4, Klf4, Sox2, cMyc from human sources

Agent: Coccidoides immitis or posadasii
Environmental Sample Processing | Animal Work | Tissue Culture
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance

Agent: EBV
Tissue Culture Animal Work
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance
Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization |
Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level Enhanced (BSL-2+)
Vote for Motion: 17 For Motion | 2 Abstain

#125-25 Adam Spivak. Cell Proliferation and the HIV Reservoir; HIV and Aging Registry.

They are a physician-scientist focused on HIV infection. Their lab studies HIV persistence and cellular senescence, and will be working with human tissues (primarily peripheral blood mononuclear cells) in culture.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: N/A
Agent: HIV infected samples
Tissue Culture Animal Work
Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |
Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |
Antibiotic Resistance
Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization |
Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 Enhanced (BSL-2+)
Vote for Motion: 17 For Motion | 2 Abstain

#01-24.03 Hongchao Guo. Amendment to add adenovirus and AAV.

The research interests of the Guo lab focus on deciphering the genetic mechanisms underlying cardiovascular diseases and cardiac development. The Guo lab has an interdisciplinary research environment, including molecular and cellular biology, cardiac physiology, genetics, human stem cell biology, and bioinformatics. They employ cutting-edge technologies including CRISPR screening, single-cell sequencing, human 2D and 3D stem cell models, and animal studies to gain broader insights into the genetic understanding of normal and pathological heart function with the ultimate goal of identifying innovative treatments and diagnostics for patients.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4

Agent: Adenovirus

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |

Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |

Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: GJA1-11k-V5; GJA1-43K-V5 from human sources

Agent: AAV

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |

Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism |

Antibiotic Resistance

Transgenes and Sources: GJA1-11k-V5; GJA1-43K-V5 from human sources; GST-GFP from human; COVID-S1-TM-V5 from viral source

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization |

Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach

PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses

Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 Stepdown (ABSL-1+)

Vote for Motion: 15 For Motion | 4 Abstain

#45-24.01 Koushik Roy. Amendment to add LCMV.

The success of vaccines hinges on generating pathogen-specific antibody and memory B-cells (MBCs). Antibodies are produced by plasma cells (PCs), and the presence of MBCs speeds up the response to pathogen invasion. Both PCs and MBCs are generated from activated B-cells (ABCs).

The NFkB transcription factor is essential for humoral immunity, and NFkB family members (cRel and RelA) are important in B-cells Biology is well established. cRel is required for B-cells proliferation, RelA is required for PCs, and both are required for MBCs generation. However, how the proportion of ABCs, PCs, and MBCs are regulated remains unknown.

The overarching hypothesis of this project is that the distinct dynamic control of NFkB family members generates distinct temporal phases that phase B-cell fate decisions and thus B-cell population dynamics. NFkB has been shown to exhibit distinct, stimulus-specific dynamic control that regulates a distinct gene expression program. Mis-regulation of NFkB dynamics leads to B-cell mediated diseases such as B cell lymphoma. However, it is not known how each phase of NFkB dynamics may be directing the generation of PCs and MBCs.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4

Agent: LCMV

Tissue Culture Animal Work

Agent Characteristics: Attenuated/Vaccine Strain | Replication Incompetent | Replication Competent |

Second Generation | Third Generation | Expanded Tropism | Narrowed Tropism | Wild Type Tropism | Antibiotic Resistance
Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization | Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 2 (ABSL-2)
Vote for Motion: 19 For Motion

Protocols for Review With 5 Year Approval

#119-25 Michael Werner. Identifying the Epigenetic Mechanisms of Phenotypic Plasticity.

They take an integrative approach to identify the epigenetic mechanisms that regulate phenotypic plasticity, and their potential roles in ecology, evolution and human health. They use a combination of biochemistry, genomics, and ecological assays. The major model organism in the lab is the nematode *Pristionchus pacificus*, which develops alternative mouth forms depending on environmental conditions. This is a useful genetic model organism, where they can use forward genetic screens and reverse genetic tools like CRISPR-Cas9.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4-a, III-E

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization | Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)
Vote for Motion: 14 For Motion | 5 Abstain

#121-25 Justin Bosch. Working with Transgenic Drosophila Animals, Cultured Cells, Tissues, and Biofluids.

The Bosch lab studies inter-organ communication by discovering and studying new hormones and receptors. They use *Drosophila* for in vivo experiments, as well as using molecular biology tools such as plasmid cloning.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4, III-D-4-a

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene
Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization | Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available
Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach
PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses
Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)
Vote for Motion: 14 For Motion | 5 Abstain

#124-25 Corrine Welt. The Genetics of Female Reproduction.

They study the genetics of female reproductive disorders.

Outstanding issues to resolve, which were communicated to PI through post-review memo.

- **SciShield:** [REDACTED]
 - In the Project Form '*The Genetics of Female Reproduction*' provide the current IACUC Protocol number. The OACC has identified protocol number 1681 as relevant to this project.

- **In Exposure Control Plan:**

- Hepatitis B Vaccination Attestation forms are digitally managed by the Occupational Medicine Program.
 - Section 5. Hepatitis B Vaccination: Remove the last three paragraphs of the section starting with "However" and ending with "administered." The Hepatitis B Vaccination program is now managed through Open Range.
 - Remove Appendix D.

- **Documentation:**

- Provide a statement to clarify if transgenic animals are being created and/or if recombinant DNA is delivered to animal models with this registration.
- The OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standards requires enrollment in the Hepatitis B program when working with human source materials, regardless of vaccination status. Contact Dr. Andy Phillips [REDACTED] at Occupational Medicine for access to the health screening questionnaire in Open Range. In the email, provide the lab name and all lab personnel uNIDs to Dr. Phillips. Once contact with Dr. Phillips has been obtained this item is considered complete by the IBC.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4, III-D-4-a, III-D-4-c(2), III-E, III-E-3

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization | Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach

PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses

Motion: Approve with contingencies at Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)

Vote for Motion: 14 For Motion | 5 Abstain

#126-25 Kristen Kwan. Cellular and Molecular Mechanisms of Visual System Development in Zebrafish.

They are interested in understanding the cellular and molecular mechanisms underlying the morphogenesis of the eye, using zebrafish as a model system.

All pre-screen comments were resolved and no additional concerns were raised during the meeting.

PI Cites NIH Guidelines: III-D-4, III-D-4-a

Risk Assessment: Sharps | Vortexing | Sonicating | Cell Sorting | Centrifuging | Oncogene

Risk Mitigation: Biosafety Cabinet | Fume Hood | Sealed Rotor or Safety Buckets | Anaesthetization | Restraints | Safer Sharps | Enhanced PPE | Treatment Available | Vaccine Available

Disinfectant: Freshly Prepared 1:10 Dilution of Bleach

PPE: Laboratory Coat, Gloves, Safety Glasses

Motion: Approve at Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) and Animal Biosafety Level 1 (ABSL-1)

Vote for Motion: 14 For Motion | 5 Abstain

Protocols for Review, Requiring IBC Approval Before Initiation, Transfer of rsNA into Humans

None

Pending Protocols

#98-25 Xinbo Yang. Electronics Scrap Recycling Advancement Prize (E-SCRAP). Cellulosimicrobium funkei.

PI has not responded to post-review memo. Reminder email sent 10/9/25, 11/12/25, 12/5/25.

Lab/Protocol Closures

None

Spills and Incidents

None

Other Business

Invited Guests:

- Dr. Gabrielle Kardon: Addressing IBC to propose use of fume hood for animal euthanasia rather than biosafety cabinet
- Dr. Jennifer Weidhaas. Presenting a proposed wastewater enrichment study to the IBC.